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Abstract This research examines the impact of manager turnover on firm perfor-
mance using information from the Dutch soccer league in the period 1986–2004. The
main advantage of using sports data is that both manager characteristics and deci-
sions and firm outcomes are directly observable. Both difference-in-difference and
2SLS estimates suggest no statistically significant improvements in performance after
manager turnover, whereas previous research based on publicly traded firm data has
found positive but very small effects of manager turnover on performance. The esti-
mates confirm previous research using soccer data. In addition, estimates suggest that
manager quality does not seem to matter in predicting turnover. These estimates are
compared and contrasted with studies using publicly traded firm data and studies using
soccer data.
Keywords Manager turnover · Firm performance · Economics of sports
JEL Classification J21 · J24 · J44
1 Introduction
This research examines the impact of manager turnover on firm performance using
information from the Dutch soccer league in the period 1986–2004. There have been
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many studies addressing the impact of manager turnover on firm outcomes but the
estimates presented in these studies turn out to be sensitive to different measures of
performance, with outcomes being relatively well-measured for publicly traded firms
and largely unknown for small firms and firms without stock-market quotations. In
addition, the timing of manager turnover is not always clear and bad performing man-
agers are sometimes transferred to other positions within the same firm without the
reasons for such transfers becoming public. In many instances, manager background
and personal characteristics are also unknown but likely to be crucial for firm outcomes
and turnover (e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2009). Finally, manager decisions concern-
ing firm investments, employment and strategy are often unobserved but important for
firm outcomes and manager performance (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003 and Bloom
and Van Reenen 2007). The main conclusion from the empirical literature addressing
the impact of manager turnover on business firm performance is that the magnitude of
the effects of management changes is statistically significant, but that the economic
significance is small in terms of performance improvements.
The main reasons for turning to sports data in addressing the effects of manager
turnover on firm outcomes are fivefold. First, firm performance can be measured
directly and on a weekly basis, whereas reliable business firm performance is often
only measured indirectly through financial statements and on a yearly basis. The main
advantage of having information on firm outcomes in short time intervals is that man-
agers are often released during the year. So, for business firm data the years prior
to manager resignation have to be compared to the years after resignation, with the
most interesting year of resignation being lost for the empirical analysis. The advan-
tage of using weekly data is that the period is short enough to isolate the manager
effect on firm outcomes, whereas annual information on firm performance is likely to
be subject to other (hard to measure) factors as well. Second, the performance mea-
sure is well-defined: win, draw or loss. In contrast, different business firms rely on
different accounting measures, which can make performance look different under dif-
ferent schemes. Third, managers’ decisions concerning firm investments are directly
observed by means of the number of players bought and sold and become effective
immediately, whereas a business manager’s long-term strategies are often becoming
effective after much longer periods of time. Fourth, the soccer league comprises one
relatively homogeneous industry, which makes the comparison across firms easier.
Finally, important manager characteristics are available, such as directly observable
past performance in management, experience as a worker (soccer player), the type of
player the manager used to be (offensive or defensive player), and the history of being
a top soccer player measured by whether or not the manager has played for his country.
For business CEOs such information on firm-specific and general human capital and
working experience is mostly unavailable.
The empirical results in this paper suggest that manager turnover is not followed by
significant increases in firm outcomes. In particular, a difference-in-difference analy-
sis reveals that firms that sack managers do even worse compared to those in a control
group whose performance is also falling substantially for some period of time. The
results are robust for different definitions of the control group and suggest that the
small positive effects of manager turnover on firm performance found in the business
literature are unlikely to be present in the sample of soccer firms. It is also shown that
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these estimates are not specific to the Netherlands and seem to apply to other major
soccer leagues in Europe as well (England, Germany, Italy and Spain). These esti-
mates are confirmed by reviewing the literature on the effects of manager turnover on
soccer team performance for these countries. In addition, analysis of the determinants
of manager turnover suggests that manager investments (measured by the number of
players bought) and the remaining contract length at the time of the dip are the best
predictors for forced turnover. When managers have invested more, in terms of the
number of players they bought, they are more likely to be sacked during performance
dips and when they have a longer period left on their current contract they are less
likely to be fired. There is also a small effect of tenure, with more experienced man-
agers having a lower probability to be fired. Finally, firm expectations and deviations
from expected performance contribute significantly to manager turnover. Using this
information, 2SLS estimates of forced resignations on performance improvements
after release suggest a positive but insignificant effect of manager turnover on firm
outcomes when comparing actual events of manager turnover to several definitions of
the control group of firms.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the theoretical back-
ground. Section 3 presents the most salient features of the data, the construction of
the measures used in the empirical analysis and a number of descriptive statistics.
Section 4 contains the estimates: (i) OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effects of turnover
on performance and a comparison with other soccer leagues, and (ii) cross-sectional
estimates of manager characteristics on the probability of being released. Section 5
relates the estimates of this study to the evidence found using publicly traded business
firm data and to the evidence from other recent analyses using soccer data to assess
firm performance after manager release. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
To determine the effects of manager turnover on firm outcomes it is important to
assess whether individual managers are central in bringing about differences in firm
performance. If managers matter there are two possible scenarios. First, a manager
will impose his style on the company. Whether this will be more likely to materialize
in well-performing or under-performing firms depends on corporate control. In sports
corporate control is often very strong, with the owners and president prominently
present at match days, so more strongly governed companies will be more likely to
select managers with a particular style. In general, firms that do relatively well are
characterized by a more prominently board of directors and owner.1 An implication
of this theory is that managers are willing to work in only those companies in which
they can exert influence on employees.
An alternative view is that managers may be hired because of their comparative
advantages in specific areas and firms optimally choose those managers who are best
1 Malmendier and Tate (2009) present evidence that award-winning managers subsequently under-perform
because they spend more time doing other things than managing their company. This effect is particularly
strong in firms with relatively weak corporate governance.
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assigned to the current needs of the firm. In this case the individual manager effect
could only be identified if a firm’s strategy is time varying. If not, the style of the
new manager would only be a continuation of the outgoing one. Bertrand and Schoar
(2003, p. 1197) speculate on the importance of the two effects and conclude that
their results “appear to suggest that better governed firms select managers with per-
formance-enhancing styles and as such might point toward efficiency implications
of the managerial heterogeneity”. Below it will be shown that in case of the Dutch
soccer league the firms’ optimal strategies do not seem to fluctuate to a large extent
over time because their league positions remain fairly stable over time. This suggests
that firms’ strategies are relatively time invariant and the characteristics of the new
manager would likely be very much like the outgoing one.
If managers do not matter for differences in performance across firms and qual-
ity does not vary across managers, the only observed performance change following
turnover would be mean reversion. This process will be characterized by a short-term
increase in performance when the new manager is in place but no long-term gains
are to be expected. In this world managers will be forced out of the firm because of
the string of bad results that can be attributed to bad luck, not bad performance, or
circumstances at the firm not directly related to the manager’s performance. In such
a view there is a market for managers in which all have to exert a certain level of
costly effort. To ensure a critical level of effort firms have to be able to threaten to
fire managers. In equilibrium, all managers are identical and supply the same level
of effort. To maintain the equilibrium effort level boards of directors fire managers to
make the other managers exert the desired level of effort. Some evidence in favour
of this theory is presented by Khanna and Poulson (1995) who compare management
in firms that go into liquidation by filing for “Chapter 11” with management in firms
doing fine over a period up to 3 years before the “Chapter 11” filing. Their estimates
suggest that managers in both samples make similar decisions and that managers of
financially distressed firms are not taking value-reducing actions to harm the firm or
its shareholders. In this setting managers who are fired are used as scapegoats to lift
the level of performance up to mean performance.
3 Data, Measures and Descriptive Statistics
In this section the most salient details about the dataset used for the empirical analysis
are discussed. In addition, a number of core measures are constructed and descriptive
statistics are presented to obtain a first glance of the estimates presented in Sect. 4.
3.1 Teams and Turnover Measures
The data consist of teams from the highest professional Dutch soccer league
(Eredivisie). Information on team performance is available for 18 seasons in the period
1986–2004. Teams included are present in the Eredivisie for at least 50 percent of all
seasons. Every year the league consists of 18 teams of which the team finishing last
is relegated and the teams finishing 16th and 17th are playing a playoff competition
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Fig. 1 Management turnover in Dutch soccer, 1986–2004.
Note The horizontal axis measures time in terms of soccer seasons. Seasons start in August and end in
May. So, 1988/89 means the soccer season from August 1988 until May 1989. The vertical axis displays
the number of departures. The total number of departures for the period 1986–2004 is equal to 184. The
number of forced resignations equals 81 and the number of voluntary leaving managers is 103
with teams from the second professional league (Eerste Divisie). The information is
obtained from Infostrada BV, a private firm collecting sports data.
The sample for empirical analysis consists of 19 teams with a total number of 184
manager turnovers of which 81 have been forced and 103 have been the result of sepa-
rations after the manager’s contract expired. This implies a relatively steep hazard rate
for managers, since during the average season over 50 percent of the teams are replac-
ing managers; 44 percent of all separations have been forced. The data on manager
turnover are collected by searching through articles about the turnover in the weekly
Dutch soccer magazine Voetbal International. In addition, Infostrada BV gave access
to their archive in which the exact date of manager release and manager appointment
is registered. This archive has been used to determine the dates of commencement of
employment and termination of the contract. On the basis of the information in the
articles from the magazine Voetbal International it is decided whether turnover has
been voluntarily or forced.
Figure 1 presents the number of resignations by season and the subdivision into
forced and end-of-contract separations. Although there appears to be a peak in the
number of manager separations in the 1996/97-season, a χ2(18) test for uniformity by
season across teams does not exceed the 25 percent critical value of 26.0. In addition,
the χ2(18) test for uniformity across teams suggests the same.2
2 A potential concern with non-uniformity is that big firms are harsher towards managers, while the per-
formance of relatively small firms is more volatile. This would lead to concentration of resignations among
big firms and performance dips among small firms, which would cast doubt on the construction of valid
control groups.
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3.2 Performance Measures
Usually, performance is measured as the number of points, which is a strictly
non-decreasing measure during a season. In illustrating performance fluctuations it
is preferred to construct a performance measure that decreases when performance
deteriorates. In addition, manager turnover often takes place during a season, so the
period of time is often shorter than a full season. An alternative would be to measure
performance as points earned per game, so that performance can vary from 0 to 1
and 3. The drawback of this alternative is that performance may get too volatile to be
altogether informative and complicate the empirical analysis considerably. The way
performance is defined in this paper is a performance measure that is related to points
per game obtained on average during the last four games.3 This way, a performance
measure is obtained that goes down in case of a series of bad games, but at the same
time is not too sensitive to an occasional loss (win) in a series of wins (losses).
In order to evaluate whether performance is good or bad, a comparison with some
“ordinary” performance level has to be made. The measure of this performance level
is based on the average number of points obtained during the current season by a
typical manager. This is a relatively short-term performance measure that circumvents
the issues of (large) changes in the squad’s composition and adjustment of annual
budgets in between seasons. It is also more appropriate compared to using league
positions at different points in time, since a team’s league position depends more on
the performance of other team than the average number of points obtained.
Finally, the relative performance of a team at a particular point in time as the four-
game point average divided by the manager’s seasonal average of points per game
has been computed. Performance defined in this way provides insight into the per-
formance of a team relative to season average. Whenever performance exceeds (falls
below) unity, the team performs at a higher (lower) level than the ordinary level. An
advantage of this performance measure is that it has the same interpretation for all
teams and can be used to present normalized performance levels and performance dips.
Appendix 1 presents more information about the performance over time of each of
the 19 teams in the data. The most striking result is that firm performance is fairly con-
stant over time. This time-invariant trend in performance would suggest that the firms’
are appointing new managers with similar styles to follow up their leaving managers.
3.3 Performance Dips
Figure 2 presents the performance levels before and after the resignation dates for
forced and voluntary resignations. On the horizontal axis the time before and after
resignation is measured. At time t − 1 the outgoing manager is in charge of his last
game. At point t (in between matches) the managers resigns and at t + 1 the man-
ager has resigned and another manager has taken over. To evaluate the effectiveness
of manager turnover, a comparison between pre- and post-turnover performance is
3 Performance levels defined by a moving average during the last three or five games do not qualitatively
alter the results.
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Fig. 2 Firm performance around management turnover.
Note The horizontal axis measures time in terms of time ahead of the dip (from t −5 to t −1) and time after
the dip (from t + 1 to t + 4). At time t (in between matches) the old manager is sacked and at time t + 1 he
is replaced and the new manager has his first result. The vertical axis displays relative performance, which
is measured as a moving average of four game results divided by the season’s average to make possible
comparison across teams. This picture is based on 81 forced resignations in the period 1986–2004, 103
voluntary departures and 212 performance dips that serve as a control group. The construction of the control
group is explained in Sect. 3.4
required. In the business literature it is common to select periods in between three
and 5 years prior to and after resignation to assess the effects of manager turnover on
firm outcomes. Here a period of four games is selected as the period of analysis. This
period of time seems to be sufficiently long to allow for a substantial effect on the
performance measure.
Figure 2 suggests that manager turnover as a result of forced resignations is accom-
panied by a substantial fall in firm performance. It is also followed by a steep increase
in performance after the manager has left. By contrast, voluntarily leaving managers
do not seem to impact firm performance to a large extent, although there seems to be
a slight rise in performance after the manager has left. Briefly investigating instant
success by looking whether the first game after the manager has left makes a difference
in case of forced resignations learns that almost 30 percent of the new managers have
won their first game. In case of voluntary turnover this equals 49 percent of all new
managers.
3.4 Construction of Control Groups
Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest a matching method to construct comparison firms
and a control group of firms to which the performance dips can be compared.4 Using
4 An important advantage of the present data is that only one industry is analyzed. When analyzing more
industries each sample firm has to be matched to comparison firms within the same industry, which is
sometimes hard to achieve. See e.g., Huson et al. (2004, pp. 247–248).
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their line of reasoning the control group to against which to measure firm performance
in case of forced resignations is constructed as follows. First, the performance at t − 4
can be at most 10 percent above its long-run average during a season. Second, per-
formance has to decline by at least 25 points during the next four games. Third, at
t − 1 the performance level is at 75 percent or less of the seasonal average. Of course,
these dips and actual resignations are mutually exclusive. Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel
(2003) apply a similar method to identify control groups, using a variety of different
but related requirements. In particular, they test the robustness of the second (between
15 and 35 percent) and third (up to 65 percent or less) requirements and find no qual-
itative differences in the conclusions to be drawn from relating the control groups to
the actual observed turnover events. In the empirical application there will be analyses
of three different control groups to see whether the construction is sensitive to the
outcomes of the difference-in-difference and 2SLS estimates.
The number of performance dips identified in this way equals 212. A χ2(18) test
for uniformity by season across teams never exceeds the 10 percent critical value
of 26.0, suggesting that all firms face performance dips to a roughly similar extent.
Figure 2 presents the performance dip of the control group, which mirrors to a large
extent the performance dips in which managers have been sacked as a result of poor
performance.
3.5 Manager Characteristics
Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations of manager characteristics available in
the data. These moments will be used to investigate whether differences in manager
characteristics are able to explain the probability of manager turnover. The columns
distinguish between sacked managers, voluntarily leaving managers and managers fac-
ing performance dips. There do not seem to be major differences in the means of the
manager characteristics available. The average age of soccer managers is around 47 and
their level of experience is around 17 years. For managers facing performance dips both
age and experience seem to be a little higher, but the standard deviations are sizeable.
The next three manager characteristics are related to their careers as soccer players.
Some 75 percent of the managers have had a career in professional soccer. Half of
that population has played at the top level, which is measured by a dummy variable
equalling one if a manager has played for his country. Finally, around 20 percent of
the population used to be playing as an attacker. The latter variable could be used as an
indicator for more risky behaviour in management compared to managers who used
to be defensive players.
The next two variables are related to tenure with the club and the number of spells a
manager has had during his career. Concerning the number of spells, the data suggest
that managers with more spells are more likely to be forced out. In addition, they seem
to have lower levels of tenure.
The number of players bought is a variable measuring the trust a board has in its
manager to do (long-term) investments. If a board would not have much confidence in
its manager it would not allow the manager to sign as many new players as a manager
which they highly trust. Another indicator of investments would be the amount of
money spent by the manager. Unfortunately, these figures are not available. It is likely
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Age (years) 46.875 46.928 47.044
(6.260) (7.174) (5.899)
Experience as a manager (years) 17.448 16.532 18.472
(6.917) (7.541) (6.707)
Playing career as soccer player (dummy variable) 0.790 0.767 0.675
(0.410) (0.425) (0.470)
Played for country (dummy variable) 0.370 0.350 0.311
(0.486) (0.479) (0.464)
Attacking player (dummy variable) 0.247 0.194 0.212
(0.434) (0.398) (0.410)
Number of spells during career 1.728 1.680 1.538
(0.962) (1.012) (0.845)
Tenure with club (days) 539.457 550.854 640.15
(376.378) (654.473) (638.270)
Total number of players bought during spell at one club 10.247 10.155 9.307
(4.170) (4.021) (3.637)
Remaining contract length when leaving (days) 336.272 23.272 635.127
(372.606) (101.724) (592.671)
n 81 103 212
The numbers in the table are means with standard deviations reported in brackets. When necessary, the unit
of observation is reported in brackets in the first column
though that the number of players bought by the manager is correlated with the amount
of money spent. The numbers suggest that managers forced out have generally bought
more players than the other managers, which could suggest that pressure is higher
when more investments have been made. Frick and Simmons (2008) find evidence for
German soccer teams that higher quality managers make better investments, which is
consistent with the measure used here.
Finally, the remaining contract length serves as an indicator of the costs involved in
sacking a manager. Usually, a manager receives the remaining salary left on his con-
tract when he is forced out or a reflection of that pay, which could serve as a burden
to firm to not sack the manager. Comparing the forced resignations with the control
group indeed suggests a large difference in the remaining length of the contract during
performance dips.
4 Results
The estimation results are presented in four parts. First, the performance dips will
be considered by presenting a set of difference-in-difference estimates. Second, the
effects of manager characteristics are taken into account. Third, firm’s expectations
are considered. Fourth, a set of 2SLS results is presented to try to adjust for the case
in which the manager would not have been released.
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4.1 Performance Dips
This section presents a number of difference-in-difference estimates. It also compares
the outcomes to an analysis of manager turnover in four other major soccer leagues in
Europe in the season 2000/1 and a somewhat more detailed analysis for Germany.
4.1.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimates
Let Yw,x denote the four-game performance average where the manager is still
in place after time t (with x > t) and let Yw,−x denote the four-game per-
formance average of the same manager before time t + 1 (at time t the “old
manager” is still in place). When the manager is forced out Yv,x and Yv,−x are
defined in a similar way. Next, A = 1 for teams facing a performance dip, and
A = 0 otherwise. Finally, when the manager is forced out B = 1, and B = 0
otherwise. The impact of manager turnover on firm outcomes y is then defined
as y = E(Yv,x − Yv,−x
∣
∣B = 1, A = 1) − E(Yw,x − Yw,−x |B = 0, A = 1). This
expression defines the difference-in-difference estimator of the four-game perfor-
mance average between the “treatment” (managers who are forced to resign) and
the “control” (managers who are facing a performance dip but are allowed to continue
their work) group in period x after the performance dip relative to period −x before
the dip.
Panel A in Table 2 reports the difference-in-difference estimation results. The first
column compares forced turnovers with the control group for all resignations observed.
What is clear is that performance increases after one period are significant but that the
new manager performs worse compared to the control group in the next three periods
he is in charge. In the popular media and soccer magazines the release of a manager
and the appointment of a new manager is often surrounded with a lot of attention and
the suggestion is often made that there will be a “shock effect”. This effect is expected
to make the team perform better and justifies the release of the previous manager. The
estimates in Panel A suggest that there is most likely a very short-run shock effect
picked up by the popular media, but that this effect is not lasting very long, in fact
only one game. The medium and long-run effects of appointing a new manager do not
seem to be very clear, and if anything are not positive.
Panel B in Table 2 presents similar results for managers with an above average
level of experience (more than 18 years). Finally, Panel C in Table 2 presents the dif-
ference-in-difference estimates for managers who have been top soccer players in the
past. Top players are defined as those players who have represented their country in
international matches. The choice for these two groups is motivated by the fact that
if a team performs below average, a manager who is relatively experienced will be
more able to solve problems and turn things around. In addition, managers with top-
playing careers are more likely to be respected by the current players because of their
achievements, so their appointment will be well received by the players, which in turn
is expected to have a positive effect on performance. The results, presented in Panel B
and C, suggest similar outcomes compared to the results displayed in Panel A. There
seems to be an immediate effect, which goes away relatively fast. What is interesting to
observe is that more experienced managers and managers with a top-player career do
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Table 2 Difference-in-difference estimates of team performance around management turnover
Baseline control Control group 2 Control group 3
group (Four-game
decline of max. 25
percent,
performance at
min. 75 percent of
season’s average)
(Four-game
decline of max. 25
percent,
performance at
min. 65 percent of
season’s average)
(Four-game
decline of max. 35
percent,
performance at
min. 65 percent of
season’s average)
Panel A: all cases
T1 0.082(0.052)∗ 0.086(0.050)∗ 0.090(0.052)∗
T2 −0.035(0.083) −0.057(0.081) −0.051(0.076)
T3 −0.188(0.098)∗ −0.189(0.089)∗∗ −0.182(0.078)∗∗
T4 −0.107(0.060)∗ −0.153(0.062)∗∗ −0.159(0.060)∗∗
Panel B: experienced managers
T1 0.098(0.045)∗∗ 0.087(0.045)∗ 0.081(0.045)∗
T2 −0.116(0.069)∗ −0.102(0.062)∗ −0.100(0.059)∗
T3 −0.177(0.091)∗ −0.132(0.068)∗ −0.122(0.061)∗∗
T4 −0.165(0.098)∗ −0.141(0.096)∗ −0.135(0.090)∗
Panel C: former top players
T1 0.043(0.052) 0.041(0.047) 0.038(0.043)
T2 −0.176(0.067)∗∗ −0.126(0.054)∗∗ −0.108(0.050)∗∗
T3 −0.236(0.115)∗∗ −0.211(0.103)∗∗ −0.192(0.099)∗
T4 −0.234(0.143)∗ −0.203(0.118)∗ −0.186(0.109)∗
Panel D: other countries
T1 0.042(0.032) 0.051(0.026)∗∗ 0.050(0.025)∗∗
T2 0.005(0.033) 0.013(0.032) 0.014(0.031)
T3 −0.072(0.038)∗ −0.063(0.032)∗∗ −0.062(0.031)∗∗
T4 −0.098(0.048)∗∗ −0.089(0.046)∗ −0.090(0.046)∗∗
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. A * indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 10 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level. TX refers to the difference in performance between t + X and t − X for a
specific group, differenced between the, at the top of the columns and panels, indicated groups. Experienced
managers are defined as managers with above average (18 years) levels of experience. Former top players
are defined as players who have represented their country in international games. The other countries are
England, Germany, Italy and Spain (details about these countries are given in Sect. 4.1.2)
worse than relatively less experienced managers and managers who have had no top-
player career, since the coefficients for the second to fourth period are generally more
negative in Panel B and C than they are in Panel A. These estimates seem to suggest
that arguments in favour of the appointment of more experienced and well-respected
managers do not help the firm to turn things around more effectively.
To assess the robustness of these results, the second column presents the perfor-
mance difference for a control group in which performance is allowed to fall to 65
percent of the season’s average to see whether the construction of the control group
is relatively sensitive to the results. The number of dips in this case is equal to 243.
Finally, the difference-in-difference estimates for the difference between forced and a
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third control group are presented in the third column. Here, performance is allowed to
fall to 65 percent of the season’s average and the decline during the four-game period
prior to the dip is allowed to be 35 percent. Now, the number of performance dips is
equal to 269.5 Although the coefficients change somewhat by constructing different
control groups, the qualitative results from this exercise do not change.
4.1.2 Are these Results Specific to the Netherlands?
For the season 2000/01 data about manager separations have been collected from
the English (Premier League), the German (1.Bundesliga), the Italian (Serie A) and
Spanish (Primera División) soccer leagues. The total number of separations during
this season in the Netherlands equals 12 (4 forced, 8 voluntary separations). These
numbers are 10 (6, 4) for England, 10 (7, 3) for Germany, 14 (9, 5) for Italy, and 15
(9, 6) for Spain, with the English and Spanish league consisting of 20 teams and the
German and Italian leagues consisting of 18 teams, like the Dutch league. This would
imply that the total number of manager separations in the Netherlands is not unusual.
The only noteworthy observation is that the number of forced resignations is higher in
all other countries compared to the Netherlands. The difference-in-difference analysis
of the pooled set of the four leagues is reported in Panel D of Table 2. The control
groups are defined in the same way as in the Dutch case and survive the tests for uni-
formity across teams. The number of performance dips for each of the three control
groups are 47, 52, and 54 respectively. The results in Panel D suggest that the same
conclusion seems to apply to the effect of manager turnover on firm outcomes in these
leagues. Again, there seems to be an immediate positive effect of appointing a new
manager, which goes away after about three games. What could be read from Panel
D is that the coefficients are more modest than the ones for the Dutch league, but in
terms of significance they are not very different.
For Germany Grüne (2000) has documented 250 forced resignations since the
beginning of the 1.Bundesliga in 1963. These resignations come with a one-page
description of the manager’s time at the club and the league position at the time of
arrival and departure. Of these observations 212 resignations can be used because they
have taken place within the same league. From these descriptions the mean (standard
deviation) tenure equals 20.231 (17.162) months and the mean difference between
the league positions when taking over and when leaving is equal to −1.052 (4.785).
The relationship between tenure and the difference in league position, controlling for
the league position when the manager is appointed, equals 0.028 (0.016), which is
significant at the 10 percent level. It implies that a one standard deviation increase in
tenure increases the difference between the initial and final league position by about
10 percent. Finally, it is interesting to observe that 12.3 percent of the managers are
sacked at the same league position at which they have been appointed and that 30.6
percent of the managers are sacked within two league positions (plus or minus) of the
position at which they were appointed. This observation suggests that 43 percent of
the population of sacked managers in the German soccer league has performed by and
5 For both these control groups the test of uniformity cannot be rejected.
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large similar to their predecessors. These results seem to be consistent with the num-
bers presented in the Appendix and in Table 1, which suggest that team performance
is relatively stable over time and that manager characteristics do not differ to a large
extent.
4.2 Manager Characteristics
Table 3 presents probit estimates of manager characteristics on the probability of
manager turnover for managers who experience performance dips. The set of con-
trol variables is the one highlighted in Table 1. The model estimated is the following
T ∗i = αXi +εi with Ti = 1 if T ∗i > 0 and 0 otherwise. Xi are manager characteristics
and εi is an error term with the usual assumptions. The estimates suggest that the
total number of players bought by the present manager, which is a measure of firm
investments, increases the probability that a manager is sacked during a performance
dip. Two other significant results are that a longer time left on the current contract
reduces the probability of forced manager turnover, which could be interpreted as
boards still having confidence in the manager experiencing a performance dip with
his team or that the sacking of the manager is too expensive if his contract length is
still substantial. The other result is that tenure with the firm reduces the probability of
manager turnover, which implies that the board takes into account the manager’s past
performance and expects him to turn things around during a dip.
When the control group is changed according to the two alternative definitions pre-
sented in the section above, the qualitative implications of the estimates do not change
and the coefficients only marginally so. Also, the indicators of manager quality, such
as experience as a manager and being a former (top) player do not seem to be good
predictors for manager turnover. This seems to suggest that manager quality does not
matter in predicting manager turnover and success, which tends to support the view
that managers are generally not able to influence firm outcomes and only play a role
in the process of mean reversion after a performance dip.
The remaining contract length seems to be a good indicator to predict turnover.
When the analysis is restricted to a subset of managers whose contract ends at the end
of the season in which the performance dip occurs and/or managers who are in their
second year or later with the firm, an insignificant negative coefficient is obtained.
This suggests that it might indeed be too expensive to sack a manager when contract
length is still substantial.
4.3 Firm Expectations
An alternative way to look at the data is to focus on deviations from expected perfor-
mance, rather than performance alone. It has been argued that boards focus on these
deviations in making manager turnover decisions (e.g., Farrell and Whidbee 2003).
In the second column of Table 3 two variables are added to indicate the present league
position during the dip and the difference between the average final league position
of the 3 years before the dip and the present league position to signal the deviation
from the expected performance. For the same purpose, the results in column (3) show
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Table 3 The likelihood of manager turnover (dependent variable: probability of forced resignation)
(1) (2) (3)
Experience as a manager (years) −0.021 −0.014 −0.015
(−0.408) (−0.362) (−0.378)
Playing career as soccer player (dummy variable) −0.007 −0.008 −0.007
(−0.132) (−0.125) (−0.127)
Played for country (dummy variable) −0.034 −0.032 −0.032
(−0.687) (−0.629) (−0.637)
Attacking player (dummy variable) 0.039 0.027 0.033
(0.738) (0.702) (0.731)
Number of spells during career 0.062 0.071 0.060
(1.458) (1.522) (1.388)
Tenure with club (days) −0.054 −0.052 −0.054
(−1.892)* (−1.811)* (−1.887)*
Total number of players bought during spell at one club 0.062 0.053 0.075
(1.929)** (1.902)** (1.996)**
Remaining contract length when leaving (days) −0.173 −0.145 −0.157
(3.994)** (2.140)** (3.257)**
Present league position 0.013
(1.925)*
Difference between average of last 3 years and
present league position −0.075
(3.281)**
Present average number of points during season −0.052
(1.569)
Difference between average of last
3 years and average number of points 0.084
(3.005)**
n 293 293 293
The coefficients are odds ratios with asymptotic t-statistics. A * indicates that a coefficient is significant at
the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level
estimates using the average number of points per game in the present season and the
difference of the average number of points per game in the last 3 years and the present
average number of points per game.
The estimates suggest that a lower present league position (the variable is measured
from 1 to 18, with 1 being the best and 18 being the worst) increases the probability of
turnover during a performance dip. More importantly, a larger difference between the
expected and realized league position during a dip increases the probability of manager
turnover substantially. Similar results are obtained when using the average number of
points instead of league position. These results are consistent with the results obtained
by Farrell and Whidbee (2003) for a sample of large publicly traded U.S. firms. They
report estimates suggesting that deviations from expected performance are important
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determinants of manager turnover. The results in Table 3 also suggest that the effects
of tenure with the firm, the number of players bought and the remaining years left on
the present contract remain good predictors of manager turnover during performance
dips.
4.4 2SLS Estimates of Performance Recovery
The estimates in Table 3 can be viewed as the first stage regression results of an
analysis in which the forced resignations are regressed on performance changes after
manager turnover.6 The problem with estimating this relationship is that it is unknown
whether manager turnover helps to improve firm outcomes because it is unknown
what would have happened if the manager had been allowed to stay. In addition, the
firm’s board has inside information about a manager and is likely to take into account
this information when deciding upon the manager’s future with the firm in case of a
performance dip. The remaining contract length seems to be a good instrument for
forced resignations, since it correlates negatively with the probability of being sacked
and is independent of experiencing a performance dip.
In Table 4 OLS and 2SLS estimates of manager characteristics and a dummy var-
iable for forced resignation on performance change (P) between t + 1 and t + 4 are
estimated for managers experiencing a performance dip: Pt4−t1 = α1 Xi + α2Ti + εi .
In this equation Ti is instrumented by the remaining time left on the current contract
in the 2SLS estimates, and Xi includes all other manager characteristics. The first row
in column (1) reports the coefficient of OLS estimates for Ti on Pt4−t1 without any
control variables. In the next row the set Xi is added and the third and fourth rows
report the estimate for Ti when firm expectations are added. All four estimates for
Ti suggest, in line with Fig. 2, that there is a negative relationship between sacking
the manager and performance recovery after manager turnover compared to a control
group of managers who have been allowed to stay with the firm.
In column (2) the 2SLS equivalent is reported. What is striking is that the coeffi-
cients change sign from strongly negative to positive, although not significant. The
positive sign implies that forced manager turnover is improving firm outcomes com-
pared to a control group in which managers are not sacked. The next two panels report
the same estimates for a less strict control group, equivalent to the ones defined in
Sect. 4.1 and reported in Table 2 above. Again the sign of the coefficients switches
when moving from OLS to 2SLS, but the estimates are not significant. In column (3)
similar estimates are reported for a different performance change, namely from one
game prior to resignation to four games after resignation. The results of this alternative
measure are similar.
Overall, these estimates suggest that OLS estimates are biased and that it is likely
that firms are using more information than merely performance indicators to decide
to sack a manager. More importantly, the 2SLS estimates suggest that, relative to dif-
ferent definitions of the control group of firms, firm outcomes do not significantly
improve after manager turnover although the coefficient is positive.
6 To be more precise, it is actually the linear version of the probit equation.
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Table 4 Manager turnover and firm outcomes (dependent variable: performance changes after resignation)
Performance changes (1) (2) (3)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Pt4−t1 Pt4−t1 Pt4−(t−1)
Baseline control group (Four-game
decline of max. 25 percent,
performance at min. 75 percent of
season’s average)
No additional controls −0.406 (0.072)** 0.333 (0.425) 0.221 (0.448)
All controls −0.473 (0.073)** 0.330 (0.500) 0.275 (0.561)
All controls and expectations of league position −0.472 (0.074)** 0.338 (0.521) 0.284 (0.569)
All controls and expectations of average
number of points −0.482 (0.074)** 0.339 (0.536) 0.299 (0.521)
Control group 2 (Four-game decline of
max. 25 percent, performance at min.
65 percent of season’s average)
No additional controls −0.389 (0.071)** 0.420 (0.369) 0.265 (0.385)
All controls −0.416 (0.073)** 0.428 (0.372) 0.271 (0.388)
All controls and expectations of league position −0.418 (0.072)** 0.429 (0.375) 0.272 (0.383)
All controls and expectations of average
number of points −0.419 (0.071)** 0.439 (0.379) 0.273 (0.383)
Control group 3 (Four-game decline of
max. 35 percent, performance at min.
65 percent of season’s average)
No additional controls −0.345 (0.070)** 0.458 (0.352) 0.308 (0.352)
All controls −0.358 (0.071)** 0.463 (0.365) 0.317 (0.355)
All controls and expectations of league position −0.360 (0.072)** 0.463 (0.364) 0.319 (0.356)
All controls and expectations of average
number of points −0.368 (0.070)** 0.469 (0.368) 0.333 (0.358)
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ** 5 percent level. The reported coefficients are the esti-
mates for the forced resignation dummy variable. In the 2SLS estimates, the remaining contract length
instruments this dummy
5 Putting the Results into Perspective
The results from the analysis are clear now but need to be put into perspective. This
is done by considering the relation to the literature in three parts. First, a link is estab-
lished between the estimates in this paper and estimates presented in the business
literature. Second, the relevance of manager quality is viewed from the perspective of
the estimates presented here and elsewhere. Finally, the estimates are related to other
estimates from the sports economics literature on the effects of manager turnover on
team performance.
5.1 Manager Turnover and Firm Outcomes
There are a relatively large number of studies investigating the relationship between
manager turnover and firm outcomes. The first category looks at stock prices as a
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measure of firm performance and basically investigates changes in stock prices before
and after manager turnover. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) made the first notable con-
tribution in the empirical economic literature on the effect of manager turnover on
firm performance.7 They show that the threat of turnover in case of disappointing
stock prices is used to control the manager using a small sample of U.S. firms for the
period 1977–1980.8 Since then many studies have focused on firm outcomes in case of
forced manager turnover. Most studies agree that the likelihood of manager turnover
increases if firms are doing relatively poorly.
It is however not so clear what happens to firm performance after managers have
been replaced. Some studies have used stock price reactions around turnover, but this
is an indicator of market beliefs about the effects of manager turnover, not the actual
effect on firm performance. Others have taken into account firm structure (Denis et al.
1997), take-over threats (Huson et al. 2001), firm expectations (Farrell and Whidbee
2003), and the composition of top executive teams (Fee and Hadlock 2004) as predic-
tors of top manager turnover. Generally, the magnitude of the effects on firm outcomes
is relatively small but positive and significant. For example, Denis and Denis (1995)
report estimates of the determinants of turnover from a sample of 908 firms in the
period 1985–1988 implying that after forced resignation the firm did better after-
wards. Huson et al. (2004) extend this study to a longer time period (1971–1995) and
solve some of the potential methodological and econometric problems the Denis-Denis
study suffers from. They find that forced turnovers are preceded by poor performance
and followed by significant improvements in firm performance in terms of operation
returns.
The estimates reported in the present paper suggest that manager turnover does not
improve firm performance significantly relative to three differently defined control
groups. There are a number of reasons for the contrasting results between studies
applying business firm data and the present estimates. First, the measures of firm per-
formance in the business literature are not without discussion. Stock prices around the
time of manager turnover are not the right measure for real outcomes but only reveal
expectations. In addition, the operating income to book assets (OROA) or to sales
(OROS) is often an industry specific measure of firm performance. Some authors have
adjusted their data for industry effects but they remain controversial (see e.g. Barber
and Lyon 1996). Soccer outcomes are measured directly and on a weekly basis and are
not surrounded by any uncertainty or measurement error. Another point worth making
is that the firm outcomes are available in very short time intervals in the soccer data.
This is an advantage since managers are often released during the year, whereas for
business firm data the years prior to resignations have to be compared to the years
after resignation in which other things than the position of the CEO change as well.
This is one of the reasons for many authors to have investigated firms’ stock prices
7 Earlier studies have mostly focused on the relationship between executive pay and performance. These
studies will not be considered here.
8 Early papers by Klein and Rosenfeld (1988), Warner et al. (1988) and Weisbach (1988) find weak evi-
dence in favor of an inverse relationship between a firm’s stock returns and subsequent top management
changes, particularly for companies with outsider-dominated boards and for companies with strong moni-
toring policies.
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on a daily basis around the time of manager turnover. Finally, the soccer league com-
prises one industry, which makes the comparison across firms easier. Indeed, Parrino
(1997) finds that performance is easier to monitor in homogeneous industries, which
makes the identification of poor management easier and less costly to observe and
replace.
5.2 Does Manager Quality Matter for Firm Outcomes?
The estimates presented above suggest that manager quality measured by the man-
ager’s previous achievements as a player, years of managerial experience and number
of spells does not significantly matter for predicting turnover and does not explain
much of the performance increase after resignation. Recent studies using business
data carried out by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for the United States and Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) for a large number of other countries suggest that manager quality
does make difference and that differences in manager quality explain a significant
portion of firm heterogeneity in among others firm performance.
There are three explanations for the obtained differences. First, most studies about
manager quality do not look at manager turnover and not at all at forced turnover.
For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) look at manager-firm pairs and estimate
whether manager fixed effects can explain differences in firm outcomes. This differ-
ence in terms of focus can explain at least part of the difference in findings. Second,
the focus in the present paper is on the top soccer league in which only 18 managers
can be employed at the same time. This small market is likely to be characterized by
a large supply of potential managers, which drives up quality and lowers the standard
deviation of average manager quality. Finally, manager characteristics and quality are
easily observed in the soccer market. In business firms, experience, number of spells,
education etc. are surrounded with much more heterogeneity. For example, it matters
whether a manager has working experience with a large high-valued publicly traded
firm instead of a small privately owned firm. Also, the years of education do not seem
to matter and differ not that much between managers. But, having a MBA degree from
a top ten university is certainly more valued than a degree from another university.
These effects are easier observed in the soccer data. In this paper it has been measured
by means of managers having had a top player career, having been a professional
player at all, and by the type of player the manager used to be. Finally, soccer man-
agers’ decisions concerning firm investments are directly observed by means of the
number of players bought and sold. These investments are likely to become effective
soon relative to the long-term strategies of business firm managers.
5.3 Evidence from Other Analyses Using Sports Data
This paper is not the first examining the impact of manager turnover on subsequent
team outcomes in sports, and in particular in soccer.9
9 Here the focus is limited to research on soccer teams. Brown (1982) uses data from American football
(the NFL) in the period 1970–1978 to assess the impact of manager turnover on team performance. His
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For the Netherlands, Van Dalen (1994), Koning (2003) and Bruinshoofd and Ter
Weel (2003) have performed similar types of empirical investigations. Van Dalen
(1994) uses data for the 1993/94 season only. He estimates a model in which he
tries to explain the difference between the goals scored. The covariates are mea-
sures of referee quality, team quality and performance in the previous game. Also
included is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the game is a home game
and a trend variable. Most importantly, he includes a dummy variable that indi-
cates whether or not a new manager has taken over during the season. His estimates
reveal that manager turnover during the 1993/94 season has a positive effect on the
goal difference. Koning (2003) focuses on forced resignations only during five sea-
sons in the period 1993–1998. The dependent variable in his analysis is similar to
the one used by Van Dalen (1994). He improves upon the analysis by Van Dalen
by controlling for programme effects, because the model used for the goal differ-
ence depends on the ranking of both teams at the moment the game is played. This
way he controls for the differences in the quality of the opponents faced by the
new and old manager. His estimates reveal that team performance does not always
improve when a manager has been forced to resign. In most cases, new coaches per-
form worse than their fired predecessors. So, Koning extends the findings and anal-
ysis of Van Dalen (1994). He also shows that the 1993/94 season is an outlier. The
main difference with the present paper is that Koning (2003) and Van Dalen (1994)
focus on much shorter time periods and use a measure of team performance that
is much more volatile compared to the one used here. The advantages of our mea-
sure of team performance are discussed in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3. Also the estimation
methodology is different, since they do not construct a control group to execute a
difference-in-difference analysis. Basically they only apply a before-after analysis on
goals scored.
Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel (2003) apply the same methodology as used in this paper.
They focus on twelve soccer seasons in the period 1988–2000, whereas the present
paper considers the period 1986–2004. In addition, Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel (2003)
do not consider measures of managerial background and investments. They only focus
on a difference-in-difference analysis and find, similar to the findings in this paper,
that forced resignations do not significantly improve team performance. Bruinshoofd
and Ter Weel (2003) also show that a before-after analysis is insufficient to pinpoint
the effects of manager turnover. The reason is the appearance of Ashenfelter’s dip in
team performance before and after resignation.
In Sect. 4.1.2 the results of a brief analysis conduced for four other countries have
been described. More advanced empirical analysis has been carried out by Frick and
Simmons (2008) for Germany, by De Paola and Scoppa (2008) for Italy and by Audas
et al. (1999) for England. Dawson et al. (2000) review the literature for England and
argue that it is important to take into account measures of manager quality and history.
All papers use a different methodology and have a somewhat different focus. However,
they all contain estimates of the effects of manager turnover on team performance.
estimates reveal that the costs are higher than the benefits in terms of games won before and after turnover.
Scully (1995) examines the effects of manager turnover on team performance in baseball and basketball.
The measure of turnover applied in that analysis is one of turnover in between seasons.
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Frick and Simmons (2008) are interested in explaining the effect of managerial qual-
ity on team performance in Germany in the period 1981–2003. Managerial quality is
measured by the manager’s salary and his past performance. In terms of the effects of
manager turnover during a season they find that it does not improve team performance,
which is consistent with the findings in this paper. De Paola and Scoppa (2008) use
the methodology of Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel (2003) to assess the impact of man-
ager turnover in Italy during five seasons (2003–2008). They confirm the estimates
for the Netherlands that team performance does not improve after forced resignation.
Audas et al. (1999) estimate hazard functions for involuntary and voluntary mana-
gerial turnover for English professional soccer for the period 1972–1997. Their data
contain over nine hundred manager spells and reveal an increase in manager turnover
over time. The estimates suggest that short-term fluctuations in team performance
increase the probability of forced resignation. They do not address whether perfor-
mance improves after a new manager is appointed. Overall, these studies confirm the
findings in the present paper that forced manager turnover in soccer does not improve
team performance.
6 Conclusion
This research has examined the effects of manager turnover on firm performance for
a unique set of firms over a relatively long period of time. The results fall in a body
of literature that is relatively large and becoming larger over the last couple of years
(see the previous section for a discussion). The general interest of the results presented
here is that using data from sports—in this case the Dutch soccer league—sheds light
on the different results obtained in many studies using (publicly traded) firms to assess
to effects of manager turnover on firm outcomes. In particular this study has shown
three main things.
First, using difference-in-difference estimates and a 2SLS strategy, it has been
shown that manager turnover is not followed by significant improvements in firm per-
formance and that manager quality does not seem to predicted manager turnover. These
results are robust to different specifications. Second, the results have been compared
and contrasted with estimates from the business literature on manager turnover and
firm performance. The conclusion from this comparison is that the ability to observe
firm outcomes and manager decisions directly is a main advantage reducing heteroge-
neity and noise in the data. Finally, the estimates are in line with the evidence found in
other studies and for other countries using sports data to assess the effects of manager
turnover on firm performance.
Appendix: The Dutch Soccer League
The highest professional soccer league in the Netherlands (Eredivisie) consists every
year of 18 teams. The composition of the league changes from year to year because
of promotion from and relegation to the second division.
The data consist of teams, which played in the highest league during at least nine
seasons between 1986/87 and 2003/04. The main reason for doing so is that infor-
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mation about these firms is most accurate and complete. There is no manager infor-
mation available for relegated teams and for teams playing only occasionally in the
Eredivisie, which makes the computation of spells hard and yields problems of cen-
soring.
The 19 teams in the data all have completed manager spells and are in alphabetical
order Ajax, AZ, De Graafschap, FC Groningen, FC Twente, FC Utrecht, FC Volen-
dam, Feyenoord, Fortuna Sittard, MVV, NAC, NEC, PSV, RKC Waalwijk, Roda JC,
SC Heerenveen, Sparta, Vitesse and Willem II. The first column in Table 5 presents the
teams and in brackets the number of seasons a team has been present in the Eredivisie
and hence is present in the database.
During one league season each team has to play every other team twice (once at
home and once away), so that the total number of games for each team during a season
is 34. For each win a team receives three points, a draw gives one point, and a loss
no points. From 1995 on the 3-1-0 points rule is effective. Before 1995 the rule was
2-1-0. For ease of comparison, I use throughout this paper the 3-1-0-rule for all years.
The ranking of teams does only marginally change when I rely upon the 3-1-0-rule
instead of relying upon the 2-1-0-rule. The most important change is that PSV would
have been the 1989/1990 champions instead of Ajax. Also, for the measurement of
performance dips the rule turns out to be unimportant. Hence, the end-of-season team
scores lie within a range of 0–102. The next columns in Table 5 present the average
number of points per game for each of the 18 seasons in the data. The number in
brackets presents the standard deviation and the number in squared brackets is the
rank at the end of the season. Empty cells indicate that a team was playing in the
second division. For the second division no data are available on managers to compile
a consistent set of manager careers.
Every season the team ending 18th relegates to the second division and the win-
ner of the second division (Eerste Divisie) is promoted to the Eredivisie. The teams
ranking 16th and 17th in the Eredivisie have to play a competition of promotion-
relegation playoff games in a small four-team competition with the teams that have
finished 2nd to 7th in the Eerste Divisie. Both Eredivisie teams are in a different
competition. The two winners of the competitions are allowed to play in the Ere-
divisie in the next season. The others play in the Eerste Divisie. In most instances
the Eredivisie teams win these competitions as can be seen from the teams finish-
ing 16th or 17th in Table 5 and their presence in the data in the next season. (See
Table 5)
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